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Executive Summary
The highly uneven distribution of Medicare payments among elderly bene-
ficiaries, combined with the predictability of some of the expenditures, poses
several challenges to the Medicare program. We present information about the
distribution of Medicare expenditures among beneficiaries in specific years,
accompanied by new evidence on the extent to which Medicare payments for
the care of individual beneficiaries persist over long time periods. Our analysis
is based on a longitudinal population of Medicare enrollees during the years
1987 to 1995. We find that high-cost users accounted for a disproportionate
share of the growth of Medicare Part A (hospital) payments during this period,
but that an increase in the number of beneficiaries using covered services was
largely responsible for the growth of Medicare Part B payments. Few bene-
ficiaries are in the highest-cost categories for multiple years; the high mortality
rates of individuals who use medical services heavily, whether the expendi-
tures occur in one year or repeatedly, limits the extent of expenditure persist-
ence. Even among survivors, it is unusual to remain in the highest-cost
categories for multiple years. Nevertheless, individuals with high expenditures
in one year are likely to have higher than average expenditures in other years,
and expenditures are highly skewed even over a period of nine years. Any
policy to reform Medicare will need to accommodate expenditure persistence
to provide adequate coverage for all beneficiaries.
I.Introduction
Policy debates about controlling health care costs and about the value
of medical expenditures necessarily focus on the minority of individu-
als who incur high costs. These debates are particularly pressing for
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the Medicare program for several reasons. First, because it covers the
elderly and individuals with long-term disabilities, Medicare has a
disproportionate share of high-cost users of health care: Even though
Medicare covers only one-sixth of the population, those covered ac-
count for around one-third of U.S. health care expenditures. Second,
Medicare is an enormous entitlement program whose expenditures
have been rising rapidly. Substantial reform of the program appears
inevitable: According to current projections of the Medicare trustees,
the Medicare Part A trust fund will become insolvent by 2001. Al-
though the Medicare recipients we study are somewhat homogeneous
because all are elderly, even within this population expenditures are
highly skewed. In 1994, for example, 62% of Medicare beneficiaries had
reimbursements averaging less than $1,000, whereas 4% had claims of
$25,000 or more, and an additional 4% had reimbursements of between
$15,000 and $25,000 (Gornick et al. 1996). Every year, approximately
10% of Medicare beneficiaries account for three-fourths of program
outlays; health expenditures in the general population are similarly
skewed (Berk and Monheit 1992). Judgments about some of the most
difficult issues for Medicare reform involve the persistence of expen-
ditures for this subset of beneficiaries.
Considerable empirical research, along with the prevalence of
chronic health problems in the Medicare population, suggest that an
individual's past use of medical services helps predict future use. The
46% of the general population that has at least one chronic condition
generates about three-quarters of all health expenditures; about 88% of
Americans 65 and older have at least one chronic condition (Hoffman,
Rice, and Sung 1996). Not all chronic conditions are serious enough to
require extensive, ongoing medical treatment. But once a person has
been treated for end-stage renal disease, severe congestive heart fail-
ure, cancer, emphysema, or many other serious conditions, we know
that he or she is likely to use medical care more frequently and incur
higher costs than individuals without a serious chronic illness. For
similar reasons, a man or woman who has high medical expenditures
in one year is likely to generate significantly higher than average health
expenditures in future years. This does not mean that it is possible to
predict any single person's health expenditures with precision, but it
does imply that entire classes of people can be identified as potentially
high-cost patients on the basis of such characteristics as their age, sex,
race, and medical diagnoses as well as their prior treatments and
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substantial predictable differences in expenditures, however, the indi-
viduals involved often know more than insurers or health care provid-
ers about their likelihood of experiencing high costs. It is difficult to
capture all of the subtle factors that may influence use of medical care
in even detailed databases, and some uses of medical care by individu-
alssuch aselective surgical procedures in previously healthy
beneficiariesmay be expected yet not predictable on the basis of any
characteristics that a payor or an analyst can observe.
These distinctive features of health care use combine to create some
very difficult and complex policy problems for Medicare, with contra-
dictory solutions. The fact that health involves small risks of poten-
tially serious and costly diseases implies that individuals ordinarily
want to obtain some kind of insurance against the possibility of these
adverse events. Insurance works best when its potential purchasers
have no special information about their risk of an adverse event and
when they all face similar riskswhether the risk of loss involves a
fire, an automobile accident, a flood, or a health problem. If risks differ,
and if the potential purchaser knows more about his or her risk than
the insurer, then risk selection is likely to create problems for insurance
markets (Pauly 1986). At any price, an insurance plan appears to be a
better value for someone who expects to use a lot of medical care than
for someone who does not plan to use much care. If each health plan
can charge only one price to enrollees, and if different kinds of health
plans are available, individuals may end up with too little insurance.
Lower-risk individuals may buy less generous insurance than they
would prefer to avoid plans with higher-risk enrollees (Rothschild and
Stiglitz 1976). This phenomenon may even cause "death spirals" of
unstable premium growth in the most generous insurance plan choices
(Price and Mays 1985).
One solution to this problem is to restrict plan choice: If everyone
must join a single plan, there is little potential for risk segmentation.
Indeed, when nearly all Medicare beneficiaries belonged to "tradi-
tional" Medicare, risk selection was not an issue. Although restricting
choice limits the adverse selection problem, many critics have argued
that it creates other serious problems. With a captive audience, an
insurer does not need to make sure that it is producing the benefits and
services that its enrollees most desire for the cost. Enrollees also have
little incentive to consider whether the services they receive in the plan
are worth the expenditures involved. For these reasons, Alain En-
thoven (Enthoven and Singer 1996) and others have advocated reforms156 Alan M. Garber, Thomas E. MaCurdy, and Mark B. McClellan
that increase health plan choice and thus competition to increase
efficiency in Medicare. Among other things, such reforms would give
individuals more alternative plans (and more useful information about
those choices) and stronger financial incentives to choose a plan that is
worth the cost. For example, Medicare might pay a fixed amount per
year toward a beneficiary's purchase of any of a range of accepted
plans. But such reforms could increase pressures for adverse selection
and substantially increase many beneficiaries' out-of-pocket costs of
care. Healthy beneficiaries would have stronger incentives to select less
generous plans, and individuals with chronic illnesses might have to
pay considerably more for plans that provided better coverage for their
conditions. The system of plan choice that Medicare uses today may
have developed in part to avoid such problems. Beneficiaries can
choose to join managed-care plans, but in contrast to the choice system
used by many private firms, price competition among such plans is
severely limited. As a result, plans must compete largely on the basis
of benefits, which limits one of the dimensions on which selection can
occur (McClellan 1997).
One approach to address the adverse selection problem while allow-
ing health plan choice is to risk adjust the premiums that health
insurers and health plans receive. Improving risk adjustment methods
has become a major research and policy concern (lezzoni 1994). A
principal goal of risk adjustment methods is to compensate health
plans and providers for the intrinsically higher costs of care associated
with higher-risk enrollees and conversely to limit the financial rewards
from attracting relatively healthy enrollees. A perfect risk adjustment
system would feature premiums that matched an individual enrollee's
risk, so that health plans and providers would compete on the basis of
quality of care rather than risk selection.
Risk adjustment, however, is not currently able to overcome adverse
selection and the problems it causes. First, perfect risk adjustment is
not feasible. State-of-the-art risk adjustment methods based on diagno-
ses typically explain about 7% of the variation in medical expenditures
from one year to the next. Although much of the remaining 93% may
not be predictable, and thus is not a problem for insurance markets, a
considerable fraction of it is likely to be predictable, in the sense that
beneficiaries know it when they are choosing plans. For example,
many intensive medical procedures such as elective joint replacements
or cataract operations are largely predictable, in that an enrollee may
be able to wait several months from the time that he or she suspectsPersistence of Medicare Expenditures among Elderly Beneficiaries 157
that the operation would be beneficial, so that the need for the proce-
dure is known well in advance. In addition, prior use of intensive
procedures such as hospitalizations or major operations, as well as
prior expenditures, have considerably more predictive power for ex-
plaining expenditures compared to diagnoses alone. But if intensive
treatments and prior expenditures are included in risk adjustment
methods, they introduce another incentive problem: An individual or
a plan would be more willing to provide higher-cost treatments, be-
cause they would know that providing those treatments today would
increase the payments they would receive in the future.1
Finally, risk adjustment may have substantial distributional implica-
tions, which many economists have argued should be addressed di-
rectly, or at least should be understood explicitly when they are
undertaken implicitly in social programs. To the extent that expendi-
ture differences in the future are known and Medicare compensates
beneficiaries for these differences, then Medicare is redistributing
wealth from low- to high-risk individuals rather than simply providing
insurance. For example, if I know that I am likely to develop chronic
lung disease, because it runs in my family or because I smoke, it might
make sense for me to save money now in anticipation of the costs of
hospitalization or higher costs of my insurance in the future. Such
precautionary saving is expected when future events are certain and
compensation through an insurance program is not available. Without
risk adjustment, I might save more, because I would not expect as
much compensation from Medicare over my lifetime; with risk adjust-
ment, I would probably be better off, but those with lower risks of
chronic illnesseswho would presumably receive fewer benefits or
would contribute to the risk adjustment paymentsmight be worse
off. Every policy option for Medicare has distributional implications
for those with and without high risk of illness, and the potential
magnitudes of predictable differences in health costs across individu-
als imply that such redistribution may be large.
This review of some of the conflicting efficiency and distributional
problems facing potential reforms in the Medicare program highlights
our surprisingly limited understanding of a crucial topic for balancing
all of these concerns: the persistence of expenditures for Medicare
beneficiaries over long time periods. Virtually all the studies of risk
adjustment and adverse selection in Medicare assess differences in risk
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from one year to the nexta relatively brief portion of most beneficiar-
ies' years enrolled in Medicare. This limited perspective can lead to a
correspondingly limited and potentially misleading perspective on
Medicare reforms. For example, the presence of a chronic illness such
as cancer in one year may predict expenditures much higher than
average in the next year, as the patient receives followup therapies to
consolidate the initial cancer treatment. But if the cancer goes into
remission or is cured, then the patient's expenditures may not be very
much higher than average in subsequent years. Alternatively, an indi-
vidual with very high expenditures due to a severe chronic illness such
as advanced heart failure may die within several years of developing
the condition, again limiting the illness's importance from the stand-
point of long-term risk selection. The fact that 27% of Medicare expen-
ditures occur in the last year of life suggests that this limitation on
long-term persistence is important. Consequently, single-year expendi-
tures or expenditure persistence over two years may give a misleading
picture of longer-term expenditure persistence in Medicare; beneficiar-
ies who have the highest expenditures over many years may look quite
different from beneficiaries who have high expenditures over only two
or three years. Thus policies based on year-to-year persistence may
have unintended effects. They may target efforts to provide long-term
access to adequate insurance and compensation on individuals who
experience high-cost episodes of care for a year or two, rather than
those who face the greatest problems of long-term expenditure
persistence.
Another important reason to assess differences in Medicare expen-
ditures over longer time periods concerns the "moving target" nature
of Medicare policy problems. Treatments available for health problems
change, with potentially important consequences for the concentration
of expenditures and their persistence over time. For example, as new
but costly treatments for irregular heart rhythms and heart failure
become available, persistence may increase if individuals who would
have died from the condition now survive longer with a costly chronic
illness. If changes in treatment affect low- and high-cost patients dif-
ferently, the concentration of expenditures in Medicare in 1992and
the reasons for the concentrationmay be quite different from the
concentration in 1997. Thus risk adjustment methods may become
outdated as novel treatments are introduced, but there is little infor-
mation with which to assess the performance of specific risk adjust-
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Moreover, to the extent that Medicare expenditure growth is a policy
concern, understanding the sources of expenditure growth is critically
important. Although a small fraction of individuals may account for a
large share of expenditures at a given point in time, they may account
for a relatively larger or smaller share of expenditure growth, suggest-
ing that efforts to address expenditure growth should be adjusted
accordingly.
For all of these reasons, a longer-term perspective on expenditure
persistence can provide crucial evidence for policy. We present new
evidence on the extent to which expenditures persist over long time
periods in the Medicare program and on the contribution of high-cost
beneficiaries to Medicare expenditure growth. Our analysis of persist-
ently high medical expenditures is based on a longitudinal population
of Medicare enrollees. The sample is representative of all Americans
65 years of age and older. We focus on the persistence of expenditures
for services the Medicare program covers. However, we also consider
these beneficiaries' out-of-pocket payments and thus total expendi-
tures for Medicare-covered services. Certain medical expenditures not
covered by Medicare, in particular outpatient pharmaceuticals and
long-term nursing home stays, are not included.
In the next section, we describe our data set in more detail. The
section after that presents results on expenditure persistence over long
time periods. We review the concentration of expenditure growth in
high-cost users leading to significant increases in the skewness of
Medicare expenditures over time. We also describe in detail how
expenditures persist over time periods as long as a decade and analyze
the contribution of death and returns to lower expenditure levels in
limiting long-term persistence. We find that expenditure persistence
over long time periods is actually quite different from that suggested
by year-to-year persistence. In the final section, we discuss some im-
plications of these results for a range of proposed Medicare policy
reforms and highlight some further questions for research.
II. Data
To study expenditure persistence, we compiled longitudinal summary
data from all Medicare claims filed by a random sample of approxi-
mately 37,000 beneficiaries (0.08% of all Medicare beneficiaries) over
the nine-year period from 1987 through 1995. We focused on total
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expenditures (including both acute and nonacute admissions covered
by Medicare), hospice expenditures (Part A), home health expendi-
tures (mainly Part A), outpatient hospital expenditures (Part B), and
physician and other supplier expenditures (Part B).2 We considered
two principal measures of each of these types of expenditures: actual
Medicare program expenditures (Medicare reimbursement) for the
care of beneficiaries and total expenditures for these services, inclusive
of patient payments. Thus total expenditures included the beneficiary's
liabilities due to copayments, deductibles, and maximum limits for
Medicare payments. Expenditures for services Medicaid does not
cover at all, such as outpatient prescription drugs, were not included.3
For the most part, beneficiary payments track Medicare reimburse-
ments closely. Although we focus primarily on Medicare program
payments in the results below, results for total reimbursement and
patient payments were quite similar
We calculated annual expenditures by summing up all valid claims
of each type. We excluded all beneficiaries younger than 65 years of
age as well as beneficiaries who resided outside the United States or
were enrolled in health maintenance organizations.4 We converted all
costs into constant 1996 dollars using the general Consumer Price
Index (CPI).
III. Results
Contribution of High-Cost Beneficiaries to Expenditure Growth
Early in the 1980s, the Health Care Financing Administration ad-
dressed rising hospital costs by introducing the Prospective Payment
System (PPS) for Medicare-financed hospital care covered by Part A.
We integrated information from the five major administrative data files the Health
Care Financing Administration maintains: claims for hospital and skified nursing facility
stays (MEDPAR, or Medical Provider Analysis and Review ifies), home health care
(HHA, or Home Health Agency), hospice care, and outpatient visits and other Part B
services (from the "Outpatient 5% Bifi Skeleton File" and BMAD, or the Part B Medicare
Annual Data ifies).
The other major type of uncovered service is long-term stays in nursing homes.
Nursing home admissions after an acute-care admission are covered for the first 100
days, so that Medicare now covers the vast majority of shorter, nonacute hospital stays
for the elderly.
We excluded these patients because detailed claims informationwhich we intend
to use in later workis not reliably available for them. Assigning the relevant Medicare
Annual Adjusted Per Capita Cost (AAPCC) rate for the HMO beneficiaries and including








Percentage of beneficiaries who receive Part A and Part B services
Subsequently, it introduced changes in payments for Part B (primarily
physician) services as well, although none represented as dramatic a
change in the basic payment approach as the introduction of PPS. By
the late 1980s and early 1990s, Part B drew more attention because its
expenditures were rising. Although Part B claims are usually much
smaller than Part A claims, many more Medicare recipients have Part
B claims As figure 5.1 shows, essentially all Medicare recipients who
have any claim in a given year will have at least one Part B claim Any
other result would be surprising, because it is difficult to be hospital-
ized (largely reimbursed by Part A) without receiving the services of a
physician (reimbursed by Part B). In addition, the fraction of Medicare
recipients using Part B services has traditionally been large and grew
substantially from 1987, when the fraction was 74%, to 1995, when 84%
had claims.
An immediately apparent group of "high-cost users" of Medicare-
covered services consists of all beneficiaries who were hospitalized,
that is, who had a Part A claim. Between 1987 and 1993, the fraction
using Part A services grew slowly, from 19% to 22%, and actually
declined to 21% in 1995. Despite the slow growth and late decline in
the fraction with hospital claims, inflation-adjusted Part A expendi-
tures among hospitalized patients grew more rapidly than the Part B
claims among those who used Part B services. Real Part A reimburse-
ments per individual with a Part A claim rose by 58% between 1987
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Figure 5.2
Average Medicare payments per elderly beneficiary, 1987-1995
and 1995, while reimbursements for Part B patients with claims rose
by only 12%. Overall Medicare reimbursements for patients receiving
services rose by 37%. Thus, in a period when Medicare's PPS for
hospital care had been in place and when hospital use generally
declined, the cost of each hospital admission, rather than growth in the
fraction with hospital claims, drove Part A expenditure growth. In
contrast, the number using services, rather than the total value of
claims per recipient using services, explained most of the growth in
Part B expenditures.
As can be seen in figure 5.2, combined Part A and Part B expendi-
hires per Medicare beneficiary rose substantially from 1987 to 1995. In
1996 constant dollars, expenditures per enrollee were $2,736 (of which
$1,153 was Part B) in 1987 and $4,267 ($1,471 Part B) in 1995, a 56%
increase. The beneficiaries who had Part A claims used Part Breim-
bursed services more than twice as heavily as average Medicare
beneficiaries. These services include both office visits and physician
services administered during hospitalization.
During this period expenditure growth was concentrated among the
high-cost users of Medicare-reimbursed services (figure 5.3). Although
few Medicare enrollees had no claims (about a quarter in 1987, and
only 15% in 1995), the typical enrollee's claims were modest. Median
expenditures rose from $647 in 1987 to $884 in 1995, a 37% cumulative
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Figure 5.4
Shares of combined Part A and Part B Medicare expenditures by percentile groups in
selected years
experienced a cumulative rate of growth of 52%, as average expendi-
tures rose from $28,000 in 1987 to $42,000 in 1995. Changes in the share
of expenditures attributable to each percentile group also reflected this
concentration of growth in the upper percentiles of expenditures, as
figure 5.4 shows. This figure plots the proportion of combined Part A
and Part B expenditures due to each percentile group by expenditure
and shows that by 1995 the top 2% of Medicare recipients, ranked by
expenditure levels, accounted for about the same fraction of overall
expenditures as the lower 90%. The percentage of expenditures falling
into the very highest percentiles, not shown in figure 5.4, suggests an164 Alan M. Garber, Thomas E. MaCurdy, and Mark B. McClellan
even more dramatic concentration of expenditures among the highest
cost users. In 1995, the group falling between the 99th and 99.5th
percentile accounted for 7% of all expenditures, the group from 99.5th
to 99.9th percentile accounted for an additional 8%, and the top one-
tenth of one percent of recipients accounted for nearly 4% of Medicare
expenditures. Overall, therefore, the top 1% accounted for about 19%
of Medicare expenditures; the portion of expenditures attributable to
the highest percentiles tended to rise with time.
The upper percentiles were also responsible for a rising share of Part
A expenditures. The 80th percentile is a particularly interesting group
because this very crudely approximates the percentile that would
result from having a hospitalization during the calendar year. The
8Oth-9Oth percentile group's share of total expenditures declined
slightly, from about 20% to 18%, between 1987 and 1995. Although
average Medicare expenditures for this group rose by 15% over these
years, average expenditures for the 95th percentile rose by 39%, and
average expenditures for the 98th percentile rose by 52%. Thus high-
cost users of Medicare services were disproportionately responsible for
both the level and the rate of growth of Medicare expenditures.
Persistence of Expenditures over Multiple Years
Skewness in annual expenditures, even if it increases over time, does
not imply that the adverse selection problems noted in the introduction
will occur. Such problems occur only if variation in expenditures is
predictable. One aspect of predictability is persistence: Do Medicare
beneficiaries with high expenditures in one year tend to have high
expenditures subsequently? The answer, according to the results in
tables 5.la to 5.ld, is yes. Each of these tables presents information
about beneficiaries according to their expenditure group in 1989 (top
set of rows) and 1993. Figures 5.5a (for 1989) and 5.5b (for 1993)
illustrate graphically some of the findings from table 5.la. Figure 5.5a
shows that if a beneficiary was in a high expenditure group in 1989,
his or her expenditures one or two years before, or one or two years
later, were expected to be higher than average. Similarly, a person in
the low expenditure group in 1989 could be expected to have lower
than average expenditures in the years immediately preceding or
following 1989. Figure 5.5b demonstrates that these results also apply
to 1993 categories and are especially pronounced for the top percen-
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the group that fell between the 50th and 80th percentiles in 1989 were
more than double those of the low-ranking group from 1989. As
expected when expenditures are moderately persistent, although high
(low) expenditures in 1989 are associated with high (low) expenditures
in the years before and after, the variation in expenditures by percen-
tile group is greatest during 1989. This observation merely reflects the
fact that the percentile groups are based on 1989 expenditures, not that
the overall skewness in expenditures was different in the other years.
It is consistent with simple regression to the mean.
These results, which also appear in table 5.la, are calculated by
assuming that decedents are no longer considered part of the popula-
tion generating costs. Thus, after they die they are not included in the
denominator (i.e., population size) used to calculate average expendi-
tures. For most purposes, this is the most appropriate way to view
decedents. However, in other circumstances one might want to con-
sider decedents part of the relevant population even after they die.
Suppose that health insurance contracts are written for three years, so
that premiums are paid at the outset to provide coverage for the entire
three years. In effect, a person who dies during the first year continues
to be part of the relevant population and has contributed to insurer
revenues for the entire three years but is certain to generate no further
costs after death. From this perspective, from the time of death a
decedent is the same as a survivor with zero medical expenses. Table
5.lb presents results like those of table 5.la, except that decedents
continue to be treated as part of the population and are assigned zero
expenditures after death. Figure 5.6 displays these results graphically
as they apply to the 1993 base year. As expected, inclusionof decedents
reduces the amount of apparent persistence; in the years following
1989 and 1993, the high-group average expenditures are not as high as
when only survivors are included. The approach of death is associated
with high expenditures, but death itself blunts the persistence of high
expenditures.
Since decedents have disproportionately high costs, high-cost users
must have relatively high mortality rates. Figure 5.7 (and table 5.lc)
show that mortality rates are relatively high for Medicare recipients in
the top percentiles of expenditures and that the excess mortality is
concentrated in the first years after the high expenditures. Cumulative
mortality during the succeeding two years is about three times as high
for those in the high-expenditure group as for those in the low-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cumulative death rates of the 1989 expenditure groups
the year of high expenditures; for example, during 1989, the highest
percentile group had more than 14 times the mortality rate of the lower
half of the Medicare beneficiaries. Although the dramatic difference in
mortality rates narrows over time, in every subsequent year the annual
mortality rate of the beneficiary group that had high expenditures in
1989 equals or exceeds that of the group that had low expenditures in
1989. A similar phenomenon can be seen in the lower panel of the
table, which gives results by 1993 expenditure rank. Mortality rates
increase with the expenditure level, even several years after the high
expenditures are incurred.
Perhaps the simplest view of persistence of expenditures across
years appears in table 5.ld, which shows the rank group in various
years according to the rank group in either 1989 or 1993. For example,
about 78% of the beneficiaries who were in the low-expenditure group
in 1989 had been in the low-expenditure group two years before, and
about 66% of them remained in the low group two years after. Of the
beneficiaries in the high-expenditure group in 1989, only 42% had been
in the low group two years before, and only 43% were in the low group
two years later. The general pattern of persistence was the same for the
1993 groups. Note that high-expenditure individuals are more likely to
be in the high-expenditure group than either the middle or the low
groups, either two years before or two years after the baseline year of
1989 or 1993. But the 40% mortality rate within two years of being in
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Expenditures for the care of Medicare beneficiaries, according to
these results, are neither highly persistent nor uncorrelated from one
year to the next. Beneficiaries who have high expenditures in one year
are likely to have high expenditures the next year and in subsequent
years and are likely to have had higher expenditures in the past. Yet
past expenditures only predict future expenditures moderately well,
and the fact that expenditures rise sharply before death limits persist-
ence, so that many of the high-cost users of Medicare services cannot
continue to have high expenditures. We now explore in greater detail
the characteristics of high-cost users, particularly those whose high
costs extend over more than one year.
Implications for the Long-Term Concentration of Expenditures
We can define persistently high-cost users as beneficiaries whose
Medicare expenditures place them in the upper percentiles for multi-
ple years. Table 5.2 displays the characteristics of Medicare recipients
who can be considered to have high expenditures over more than one
year during our nine-year period of observation. The first row, which
shows the percentage of beneficiaries in various categories of persist-
ently high expenditures, suggests that it is unusual for a beneficiary to
have multiple years of very high medical expenditures. Over the
period, 47% were in the top quintile at some year in the nine-year
period. About 30% were in the top decile for one year, but few
beneficiaries remained in the top decile for multiple years. For exam-
ple, only 10% of beneficiaries were in the top dedile for two or more
years and only 1.2% were in the top decile for four or more of the nine
years. Less than 4% were in the top 5% of expenditures for two or more
years.
Individuals in high-expenditure categories, especially for multiple
years, have very high mortality rates. The two-year mortality rate
exceeds 50% for individuals in the top decile for two years or more. It
is nearly as high for beneficiaries in the top 20% in two different years.
High-cost use in multiple years is associated with greater mortality
than very heavy utilization in one year; for example, one- and two-year
mortality rates are higher for individuals in the top 20% in any two
years than for those in the top 5% in a single year, even though
expenditures are much higher in the top 5%. Most deaths occur within
one year of the high-cost use (i.e., following the period called "expense
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Even though long-term expenditure persistence has a limited extent,
the high concentration of expenditures at any given time implies that
this small share of beneficiaries may still account for a large portion of
long-term Medicare expenditures. The last rows of table 5.2 demon-
strate that this is indeed the case. For example, the 30% of beneficiaries
in the top decile in any year had average annual expenditures of
almost $10,000 over the nine years, and they accounted for 78% of total
expenditures during this long period. Similarly, the 3.9% of beneficiar-
ies in the top 5% of expenditures for two or more years accounted for
more than one-fifth of Medicare expenditures over the nine year pe-
riod. These concentrations are considerably lower than a one- or two-
year perspective would suggest. For example, beneficiaries in the top
decile for one of the nine years have mean expenditures of about
$27,000 during that year. Individuals in the top decile for four of the
nine years have mean expenditures of more than $29,000 during each
of the four years of high expenditures. Although expenditures during
a single year are more highly concentrated, these results confirm that
a relatively small share of beneficiaries accounts for a large portion of
Medicare expenditures over a period of several years.
IV. Discussion
The challenges raised by the existence of a group of patients with
predictably high expenditures become greater if those expenditures
remain high for prolonged periods. The very fact that a Medicare
beneficiary has high expenditures one year, we saw, increases the
likelihood that he or she will have high expenditures in a subsequent
year. The consequences are many, including the possibility that
providers and insurance plans can use information about prior utiliza-
tion to estimate a potential enrollee's risk of having excessive future
expenditures. The challenge is not limited to competitive health insur-
ance or health care markets, either; risk selection at the provider level
can occur in any system of regional or national health insurance,
whether in the traditional British National Health Service model, a
Canadian-style single payor system, or in recently modified versions
of these systems that introduce limited capitation at the primary-care
physician level and greater financial sensitivity.
Risk selection does not require highly accurate prediction of costs.
Any ability to distinguish among groups of patients or beneficiaries
expected to have differing average costs is sufficient. Many individualsPersistence of Medicare Expenditures among Elderly Beneficiaries 177
assigned to a high-cost group could turn out to have below-average
costs, and some individuals assigned to low-cost groups subsequently
have very high costs. Such group assignment might be inaccurate
because only limited relevant information is available or because much
of the variation in health costs is truly random. Whatever the reason
for the inability to predict health expenditures precisely, adverse selec-
tion will occur as long as expected costs can be distinguished.
We analyzed costs over prolonged periods of time among the elderly
Medicare population. For the results presented here, we did not use
clinical data (such as diagnostic information or previous use of specific
procedures) to identify individuals with persistently high costs. But we
found that the level of prior utilization, with or without demographic
information, strongly predicted future expenses. Heavy use of health
services is unlikely to cause heavy use in the future; instead, it is a
marker for ill health and other characteristics that lead to consumption
of health care. Additional information from the claims files and de-
tailed clinical characteristics would have greatly enhanced our ability
to predict expenditures in this population. Most insurers have much
more information available in evaluating potential enrollees, and the
potential enrollees themselves may know even more about how their
health care consumption is likely to deviate from average.
Our major purpose was not to assess predictability, however. We
sought to learn whether persistence of high health expenditures is an
important phenomenon in the Medicare population. Our results show
that it is significant, particularly if we consider the upper quintile of
expenditures, but that very few Medicare recipients fall into the top
percentiles of expenditures for many years. Thus, the high skewness
of expenditures in cross sections of Medicare recipients is not caused
by a small group of enrollees who use extraordinary amounts of care
year after year. Many of the highest-expenditure beneficiaries die soon
thereafter, and many survivors have more modest expenditures in the
succeeding years. Individuals who do have persistently high expen-
ditures, however, account for a disproportionately large share of
expenditures.
The importance of persistence must be considered in any health care
financing reform. For example, financing based on medical savings
accounts (MSAs) usually consists of a combination of catastrophic
health insurance (i.e., insuranceusually indemnitywith a very high
deductible) and a tax-advantaged savings plan to pay for high ex-
penses. Although many of the MSA plans that have been offered by178 Alan M. Garber, Thomas E. MaCurdy, and Mark B. McClellan
individual employers in the United States have very weak savings
features (limited or no ability to carry over unspent funds from one
year to the next and no ability to allow returns on balances to accumu-
late on a tax-deferred basis), the current MSA demonstration and most
versions seriously proposed strongly encourage savings. As MSA
balances grow large, the funds available for catastrophic deductibles
(as well as copayments for the catastrophic insurance component)
grow. Whether a given balance is adequate, of course, depends on the
level of out-of-pocket expenses an individual bears. These expenses
would be high if, for example, an individual approached or reached
the catastrophic deductible level for several years. The deductible or
catastrophic threshold can be lowered and the copayment rate (or the
ceiling on copayments) lowered to provide more insurance and require
less reliance on the MSA funds or on non-MSA personal funds.
The features of MSAs allowed for testing under the Health Insurance
Portability and Availability Act (HIPAA), which went into effect in
1997, are instructive in this regard. The deductible for qualifying insur-
ance plans is at least $1,500 and no more than $2,250, and the out-of-
pocket maximum cannot exceed $3,000. For family accounts, the
allowable deductibles range from $3,000 to $4,500 and the out-of-
pocket limit is $5,500. An MSA plan directed toward the elderly might
feature different deductibles, copayments, or limits than these. But
note that the average annual Medicare expenditure exceeds the cata-
strophic deductible, and that essentially every Medicare recipient with
a hospitalization would exceed the deductible that year. Furthermore,
our results suggest that many would also reach the ceiling on copay-
ments. If the deductibles and copayments were set so that only the top
decile of Medicare recipients would reach the ceiling in any year, about
1% of all beneficiaries would reach the ceiling more than four times
over a nine-year period, and nearly a third would reach the ceiling at
least once during the nine-year period. For individuals who had con-
tributed to MSAs for decades before reaching these ages, the accumu-
lated funds might readily accommodate such expenses. During a
phase-in to MSAs, however, or for individuals who had not been able
to build fund balances (for example, because of ongoing medical
expenses or inability to make adequate contributions), such expenses
might be difficult to bear. The consequences of the moderate degree of
persistence in expenditures within the Medicare population depend on
the specific features of any MSA plan.Persistence of Medicare Expenditures among Elderly Beneficiaries 179
These results are based on a sample of patients whose care was
reimbursed on a cost basis (i.e., not on a capitated or "risk" basis).
Capitated payments change provider behavior and are expected to
modify the amount of care that individuals with persistently high
expenses receive. Managed care features might reduce the skewness in
expenditures by limiting the amount of care that the highest-cost
beneficiaries receive, but this is not certain. For example, the original
literature comparing costs of health maintenance organizations (I-IN/lOs)
and fee-for-service care suggested that HMOs, then the sole example
of capitated health care plans, achieved savings by reducing hospitali-
zation rates. Less evidence is available about the costs for hospitalized
patients under HMO and fee-for-service plans, but given that a hospi-
talization has occurred, hospitals treating Medicare patients face incen-
tives very similar to those faced by an HMO. Under PPS, they receive
a fixed payment per hospitalization, so there is no incentive to overuse
services. In recent years, the routine practice of utilization review and
the threat of claims denial have reduced the physicians' and hospitals'
discretion to admit patients who could be easily treated on an outpa-
tient basis. For each of these reasons, the growth in Medicare risk
contracts, that is, the increased acceptance of capitated payment, may
not reduce hospital utilization dramatically, and utilization among
Medicare beneficiaries would then remain highly skewed.
If utilization does change, it will be important to learn how it
influences outcomes among the sickest Medicare beneficiaries. Our
analysis was not designed to assess the appropriateness or effective-
ness of expenditures for health care among Medicare recipients. It will
be important to learn about their characteristics in much greater clini-
cal detail. We found that individuals with high expenditures have high
mortality rates, whether such expenditures are limited to a single year
or occur repeatedly. But the majority of patients who reach the top
decile of expenditures survive at least two years, and about half the
beneficiaries in the top decile for multiple years survive for at least two
years. These results clearly show that not all high-cost care is given to
individuals who will die soon, reinforcing the concern that dramatic
reductions in such care could lead to worsened outcomes among those
who now survive after receiving such care. Definitive information
about these issues will come only from detailed investigations of the
care that severely ill Medicare beneficiaries receive, but these findings
suggest that such care cannot be readily dismissed as futile.180 Alan M. Garber, Thomas E. MaCurdy, and Mark B. McClellan
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